University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2007

Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk
Melissa B. Jacoby
University of North Carolina School of Law, mjacoby@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: University of Illinois Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

BANKRUPTCY REFORM AND
HOMEOWNERSHIP RISK
Melissa B. Jacoby*
The personal bankruptcy system is part of a larger system of
household risk management. Much of the discussion about personal
bankruptcy has focused on bankruptcy’s insurance role with respect
to unsecured obligations like credit cards and medical bills. The passage of omnibus bankruptcy legislation coupled with dramatic
changes in the home mortgage market indicate, however, that it is
time to devote more study to the role of the bankruptcy system in
managing home mortgage related risks. In this article, Professor
Melissa Jacoby identifies and begins to evaluate chapter 13 as a mortgagor protection law. She explores questions we should ask to determine whether bankruptcy is prolonging unsustainable homeownership. Professor Jacoby then considers the impact of two recent
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code relating to credit counseling and
repeat filers. She concludes that these kinds of revisions may promote
sorting based on homeownership sustainability.
I.

INTRODUCTION

All U.S. administrations and congresses in recent history have managed some kind of private party risk.1 The personal bankruptcy system
plays a role in this risk management scheme. To the extent that legal
scholarship has evaluated bankruptcy law within this larger framework, it
has tended to focus on risk associated with unsecured obligations, such as
credit cards, rent, medical bills, or tort judgments. Those debates often

* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. For helpful comments on
earlier stages of this project, thanks to Frank Alexander, Scott Baker, Susan DeJarnatt, Mechele
Dickerson, Jill Family, Adam Feibelman, Elizabeth Gibson, Mary Holder, Kim Krawiec, Keith
Lundin, Bill Marshall, Richard Myers, Katherine Porter, Steve Rhodes, Mark Weidemaier, Mark
Weisburd, Bill Whitford, participants in faculty workshops at various law schools in the summer and
fall of 2006 and participants in the University of Illinois College of Law symposium on Bankruptcy and
Consumer Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act. I also appreciate the research assistance of Elisha
Johnson and Rachel Miles, the library assistance of Nick Sexton, and the financial support of the University of North Carolina School of Law. As usual, I take responsibility for all errors. Special thanks
to Charles Tabb for inviting me to participate in the symposium.
1. See generally DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE
RISK MANAGER (2002).
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have centered on whether and how filers should be screened for the ability to pay such obligations out of future income or wealth even if they
would prefer not to pay those debts.2
In contributing to this symposium, I hope to foster a distinct debate
about the role of bankruptcy law in managing housing-related risks, particularly relating to mortgage debt and foreclosure. The time for this debate is ripe, if not overdue. The 2005 enactment of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), the impetus for this symposium, represents the most significant revision of the
Bankruptcy Code in a generation.3 We need to closely examine how
BAPCPA, as implemented in the real world bankruptcy system, affects
the use of the system to address various kinds of household financial distress, including mortgage problems. In addition, due to dramatic changes
in the mortgage credit market and a governmental push for increased
rates of homeownership, a record number of people have obtained mortgage credit that would have been unavailable to them several decades
ago.4 Incurring home mortgage debt has expanded their opportunities,
but it has also expanded their risk—for many individuals, the largest financial risk of their lifetimes.5 Thus, some scholars have suggested that
2. For examples of proposals, see Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Means Measurement Rather Than Means Testing: Using the Tax System to Collect from Can-Pay Consumer Debtors
After Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 6, 6; Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1050–51
(2004); Hung-Jen Wang & Michelle J. White, An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy System and Proposed
Reforms, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 255–57 (2000).
3. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
4. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 2005, at 16–17 (2005), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/
son2005/son2005_bw.pdf (describing change in home mortgage finance that results in broad array of
mortgage products); Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the
2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance, FED. RES. BULL., Mar. 22, 2006, at A1, A5–A6 tbl.1, A22
tbl.8 (2006); Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUS.
POL’Y DEBATE 533, 534 (2004) (reporting characteristics of subprime borrowers); William C. Apgar &
Allen J. Fishbein, The Changing Industrial Organization of Housing Finance and the Changing Role of
Community-Based Organizations 1–2 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper
BABC 04-09, 2004) (linking technological changes with opportunities and risks for low-income and
minority borrowers); Zhu Xiao Di & Xiaodong Liu, The Importance of Wealth and Income in the
Transition to Homeownership 12 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No.
W05-6, 2005) (discussing role in expansion of homeownership of underwriting and products with relaxed down payment requirements).
5. The research on this point is extensive and multidisciplinary. See Frank S. Alexander, The
Housing of America’s Families: Control, Exclusion, and Privilege, 54 EMORY L. J. 1231, 1232–33
(2005); Dennis R. Capozza & Thomas A. Thomson, Optimal Stopping and Losses on Subprime Mortgages, 30 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 115, 130 (2005) (noting that weak borrowers have a higher default rate but impose higher losses per default due to lower sales prices, higher interest expenses, and
higher legal and maintenance expenses); A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending:
The Homeowner Dilemma, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 49 (2004); Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith,
Measuring the Effect of Subprime Lending on Neighborhood Foreclosures: Evidence from Chicago, 40
URB. AFF. REV. 362, 385 (2005); Lax et al., supra note 4, at 537–39 (documenting mortgage trends,
including increasing subprime first mortgages); Orla O’Sullivan, New Foreclosure Phenomenon, ABA
BANKING J., Nov. 2003, at 77, 77–78 (Nov. 2003) (citing subprime lending as a “key reason” for record
foreclosures); Apgar & Fishbein, supra note 4, at 2–3, 7 (reporting a rise in subprime lending in both
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homeownership and mortgage debt “can as easily be a route to poverty
and debt as a guarantor of financial gain.”6 Just as bankruptcy has become a legal system of last resort for other types of financial distress, it
may be serving that role for mortgage delinquency as well.
This article focuses in particular on whether chapter 13 (repayment
plan) bankruptcy is necessary, desirable, and effective as antiforeclosure
mortgagor protection, and how two provisions of BAPCPA might alter
the answer to that question. In Part II, I start by explaining chapter 13’s
on-the-books mortgage-protection function: it not only stops a foreclosure, but also allows the filer to try to cure a mortgage arrearage over a
several year period.7 To the several hundred thousand filers who may be
pursuing this approach each year, the discharge of personal liability on
unsecured obligations is likely to be of lesser import.8 This mortgagor
protection role of chapter 13 has not been well recognized or studied by

dollar amount and volume stemming from structural changes to industry); Robert G. Quercia et al.,
The Cost-Effectiveness of Community-Based Foreclosure Prevention 2 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for
Hous. Studies, Working Paper BABC 04-18, 2004) (noting that foreclosure rates of subprime, ARMs
and subsidized products are higher than the market as a whole). The timing of foreclosure may be
different as well for subprime loans. Capozza & Thomson, supra, at 126–27.
6. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2005) (arguing that data reveal that “middle-class parents can no longer
afford to pay the segregation tax without placing themselves at risk financially”); Donna Easterlow et
al., Housing for Health: The Role of Owner Occupation, 15 HOUS. STUD. 367, 379 (2000); Sarah Nettleton & Roger Burrows, When a Capital Investment Becomes an Emotional Loss: The Health Consequences of the Experience of Mortgage Possession in England, 15 HOUS. STUD. 463, 478 (2000)
(“[T]here is now an urgent need to recognise that for significant numbers of people the costs of homeownership in a society marked by increasing levels of individualisation, insecurity and risk can be very
great, indeed not just in terms of their wealth, but also in relation to their health.”); Eric S. Belsky et
al., The Financial Returns to Low-Income Homeownership 17 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous.
Studies, Working Paper No. 05-9, 2005) (“[G]iven the considerable number of years during the study
period when renting was a better option than owning over a variety of shorter holding periods, the
constant drum beat for expanded low-income homeownership should be carefully and discriminatingly
evaluated.”); see also Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 96 TUL. L. REV. 373, 378
(1994) (recommending “that the federal government permit home equity financing without encouraging it”).
7. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical Significance,
but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 266–69 (2001) (discussing chapter 13’s “home-saving function”). For more information on chapter 13 filers, see Scott F.
Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39
CREIGHTON L. REV. 473 (2006) (reporting on longitudinal study of debtors who filed chapter 13 in
1994).
8. Although the proportions vary by district with respect to chapter choice and homeownership,
the available data suggest that roughly 30% of nonbusiness cases are in chapter 13, and about half of
chapter 13 filers are homeowners. Raisa Bahchieva et al., Mortgage Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Sustainability of Homeownership, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73 (Patrick Bolton & Howard
Rosenthal eds., 2005) (finding that a bankrupt homeowner is almost 50% more likely to choose chapter 13 than chapter 7); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Who Uses Chapter 13?, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 279–80 tbls.2 & 3 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al. eds., 2003) (finding in
regression that the largest single effect on chapter choice is homeownership among samples of debtors
from 1981, 1991, and 1999). Norberg and Velkey’s repeat filing findings, however, suggest that the
actual number of people using chapter 13 is smaller than the filing rate suggests because many individuals are filing multiple petitions. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 496–503.
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real estate scholars.9 Indeed, some real estate finance researchers have
suggested a federal override of state foreclosure laws to reduce the mortgagor protection offered by state law without acknowledging that chapter
13 has long been a federal override in the opposite direction.10 If nothing
else, this article prompts those scholars to pay attention to chapter 13.
In Part III, I consider whether chapter 13 is a sensible component of
the overall mortgage debt risk management scheme. To fully explore
this issue, we will need to know more about how the existence of chapter
13 affects lending and workout decisions, and must compare chapter 13
to alternate antiforeclosure interventions such as loss mitigation programs, mandatory foreclosure insurance, emergency loan and other
community organization antiforeclosure approaches, and state laws.11
Although in-depth research on these issues is beyond the scope of the
agenda-setting discussion in Part III, I conclude that there is a risk that
chapter 13 has been prolonging unsustainable homeownership in certain
situations.
In Part IV, I discuss how two BAPCPA provisions could produce
more upfront screening of homeownership sustainability. One provision
conditions bankruptcy eligibility on receipt of a credit counseling briefing.12 The second provision requires early judicial review of the circumstances of repeat filers. Although the drafting is less than ideal, provisions of this nature have the potential to encourage use of more targeted
antiforeclosure interventions when appropriate and to discourage home
saving in chapter 13 when doing so is likely futile.
9. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403–11 (2004). But see Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 319 (1993)
(recognizing that bankruptcy law stays foreclosures and gives debtors the opportunity to cure a mortgage default); id. at 323 (noting that federal legislation that indirectly displaces portions of state real
estate law have made real estate finance practice more complex).
10. In 1990, Clauretie and Herzog, a finance professor and an FHA actuary, respectively, proposed that Congress provide a federal override of state foreclosure laws to prevent state mortgagor
protection provisions from creating large losses. Terence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect
of State Foreclosure Laws on Loan Losses: Evidence from the Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 221, 229, 231 (1990). In another article, Clauretie and Jameson, another
finance professor, studied the timing of the foreclosure process to determine whether lenders have
insufficient incentives to proceed expeditiously through the process, with no acknowledgement that
chapter 13 could delay the process without the mortgagee’s consent. See Terrence M. Clauretie & Mel
Jameson, Interest Rates and the Foreclosure Process: An Agency Problem in FHA Mortgage Insurance,
57 J. RISK & INS. 701 (1990).
11. For the importance of comparing bankruptcy to other risk management schemes, see Adam
Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 129, 131 (2005) (“[S]cholars of social insurance have largely neglected the connections between
their own field and the operation of consumer bankruptcy law . . . [and] economists have been very
slow to consider these issues as well.”); id. at 157 (noting the omission of the bankruptcy system from
otherwise comprehensive comparative social insurance studies); id. at 161 (“[S]ome scholars of social
insurance have addressed this question with respect to nonbankruptcy social insurance programs, but
they have not factored the role of bankruptcy into their evaluations.”). See also Kartik Athreya, Unemployment Insurance and Personal Bankruptcy, ECON. Q., Spring 2003, at 33, 33.
12. See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106, 119 Stat. 23, 37–38 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h));
id. § 302, 119 Stat. at 75 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)).
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II. CHAPTER 13 AND MORTGAGOR PROTECTION: THE BASIC LEGAL
MECHANISM
Given the relative obscurity of chapter 13 to general readers, a few
words are in order about this chapter’s mortgagor protection features.
When a defaulting mortgage borrower is adamant to keep a home, and
the mortgagee is adamant to pursue foreclosure, a chapter 13 repayment
plan has legal tools that chapter 7 does not.13
When a defaulting mortgage borrower files for bankruptcy, an injunction known as the “automatic stay” almost always will stop a foreclosure in its tracks.14 Unlike chapter 7, chapter 13 permits a defaulting
mortgage borrower to propose a plan to cure the mortgage arrearage
over time while she continues with regular mortgage payments in accordance with the contract.15 If the plan satisfies chapter 13’s statutory and
case law requirements and conforms to local norms, a mortgagee’s objection to the plan is not determinative.16 Assuming the court confirms the
filer’s plan, the automatic stay continues to protect the borrower until the
plan is completed or the plan fails and the case is dismissed or converted.17 Thus, chapter 13 overrides mortgagees’ contractual and state
law rights to pursue foreclosure. Chapter 13 relief is not waivable in advance, and thus the chapter’s mortgagor protection components are a
tacit part of every mortgage loan agreement.
As noted in the introduction, chapter 13’s antiforeclosure elements
have not received as much attention as they probably should. When
economists have studied the relationship between bankruptcy and home
mortgage credit, they have focused on the protection of nonexempt
home equity from unsecured creditors rather than on foreclosure prevention.18 As a practical matter, it is important to study the antiforeclosure
aspects of chapter 13 and not just the equity protection aspects because

13. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67
AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 542 (1993) (“Lawyers say that the number one reason to use chapter 13 is the
need to save the home by paying arrearages on a home mortgage.”); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once Is Not
Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455, 495 (1999) (referring to home saving over objection of a foreclosing lender as “chapter 13’s greatest significance”);
Henry E. Hildebrand III, Consumer Corner: The Sad State of Mortgage Service Providers, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 10 n.3 (noting that chapter 13 trustees report that home saving is “the” principal
reason they see debtors filing chapter 13).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
15. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
16. Id. §§ 1325(a), 1327(a) (providing for judicial approval of plan that meets statutory criteria
regardless of creditors’ position).
17. Id. § 362(c) (describing duration of automatic stay). For a discussion of the resolution of
chapter 13 plans, see infra text accompanying notes 39–41.
18. A nondefaulting mortgage borrower (or outright homeowner) who has home equity to protect might file chapter 13 to pay unsecured creditors out of future income and to receive a discharge if
she finishes her repayment plan. For research reaching different conclusions, compare Jeremy Berkowitz & Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market for Mortgage Loans, 42 J. L. &
ECON. 809 (1999), with Emily Lin & Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy and the Market for Mortgage and
Home Improvement Loans, 50 J. URB. ECON. 138 (2001).
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the available empirical data suggest that the equity-rich bankruptcy filer
is a rare occurrence.19
Chapter 7, the more frequently utilized bankruptcy option for individuals, is also relevant to housing policy even though its primary function—the discharge—relates to unsecured debt. Consider a borrower
who has not (yet) defaulted on a mortgage but is having serious financial
trouble, or a borrower who has defaulted on a mortgage but has reached
an agreement with her mortgagee. These borrowers might file chapter 7
to discharge unsecured debt, leaving them with more available income to
make their mortgage payments and less likely to have their homes encumbered by judgment liens. A defaulting mortgage borrower also
might use chapter 7 to part with her home in the hopes of obtaining a
better sale price than a state law process would command.20 Or, a former
homeowner might use chapter 7 to shed personal liability on a deficiency
judgment from a foreclosure prior to bankruptcy.21
All of these approaches to dealing with mortgage issues intersect in
important ways; changing the contours of one option may affect others.
For conceptual clarity, however, I concentrate on the strongest form of
mortgagor protection that federal bankruptcy law offers, namely the
antiforeclosure feature of chapter 13.22
III. CHAPTER 13 MORTGAGOR PROTECTION AND UNSUSTAINABLE
HOMEOWNERSHIP
Chapter 13 generally seems to enjoy support among many bankruptcy professionals. Even when system insiders or scholars criticize
chapter 13, they rarely question the justification for chapter 13’s strong

19. In an analysis of homeowners in the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Bahchieva, Wachter, and Warren found that 2001 filers’ homes were highly leveraged and more so than those who
filed for bankruptcy in 1991; one third reported having no home equity at all (e.g., mortgage debt
equaled or exceeded home values), and more than 60% had loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of 90% or
higher. See Bahchieva et al., supra note 8, at 96–97. The high LTV ratios were not due to short tenure
in homes. See id. at 97 tbl.4.9. The filers’ mean mortgage debt had increased about 17% from the time
of home purchase to the time of the bankruptcy filing. Id. at 94 (reporting mean mortgage debt of
$88,000 at time of home purchase and $103,000 at bankruptcy filing). Home-owning debtors in the
1991 CBP had a median home equity of $5500. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 200, 221 (2000).
20. See Richard H. W. Maloy, “She’ll Be Able to Keep Her Home, Won’t She?” The Plight of a
Homeowner in Bankruptcy, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 315, 332–33 (explaining the options available to
homeowners under Chapter 7); cf. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959, 959 (1993)
(noting foreclosure sale prices are inadequate, causing debtor to lose home equity or exposing debtor
to deficiency judgment); Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional Approach
to Foreclosure Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77 (1996) (discussing lender appropriation of debtor equity in
state foreclosure).
21. For data on filers who lost their homes prior to filing for bankruptcy, see Bahchieva et al.,
supra note 8, at 93.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 14–17.
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form of federal antiforeclosure protection.23 Some scholars have suggested that chapter 13 does not go far enough to prevent home loss triggered by default on certain kinds of mortgage products.24 It is possible
that proposals to enhance chapter 13’s antiforeclosure protection will
prove to be desirable. But first we should take a closer and more critical
look.
A.

Does Chapter 13 Promote Unsustainable Homeownership?

The real estate finance literature suggests that mortgage creditors
should want to enter into workouts with sustainable homeowners because workouts in such circumstances are cheaper than foreclosure.25 By
contrast, terminating the lending relationship is preferable if the home-

23. As a slightly different matter, scholars have raised questions about whether home mortgage
debt has contributed to the financial collapse of households and thus whether it is sensible for bankruptcy filers to fight to keep their homes. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 200 (“For some, the
refusal to abandon a home that is no longer affordable brings them to collapse.”); Braucher, supra
note 13, at 542 (indicating, through interviews with lawyers, that it was difficult to convince debtors to
give up their home even when they had no home equity and it would be much cheaper to rent);
Dickerson, supra note 5, at 46 (referring to the “sunk cost trap” that leads people to “cling to their
past decisions and then incrementally make overly optimistic but good faith decisions”); Patricia A.
McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725, 728 (2005) (applying
prospect theory to individuals’ fear of home loss); see also Hazel Christie, Mortgage Arrears and Gender Inequalities, 15 HOUSING STUD. 877, 896 (2000) (reporting reluctance of households with children
to move notwithstanding house-related financial problems in a U.K. study).
24. See, e.g., DeJarnatt, supra note 13, at 497; Dickerson, supra note 5, at 51–55 (proposing that
refinance loans be treated differently than purchase money loans); Forrester, supra note 6, at 379, 452;
David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy’s Home Economics, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 43, 50 (2004) (supporting a slightly different proposal than Dickerson); Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the
American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 33–37 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Brent W. Ambrose & Charles A. Capone, Jr., Cost-Benefit Analysis of Single Family Foreclosure Alternatives, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 105, 106 (1996) (“Secondary market agencies and insurers are now actively encouraging the use of foreclosure alternatives to control losses on
mortgage defaults . . . .”); Ko Wang et al., Nondiscriminating Foreclosure and Voluntary Liquidating
Costs, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 959, 960–61, 976 (2002) (theorizing that “a bank should be more likely to
work out a solution with the mortgage borrower than to foreclose” and finding that “a bank is more
likely to negotiate with borrowers when the liquidating cost is high”); Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K.
Green, Innovating Servicing Technology: Smart Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 9 (Freddie
Mac Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004) (“Workout options have been widely adopted throughout the
mortgage industry, and home retention workouts have risen dramatically in recent years.”); id. at fig.3
(tracking growth of workouts among FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae loans); see also Apgar &
Fishbein, supra note 4, at 38 (“[M]any large lender/servicers are partnering with [community based
organizations] to develop more effective foreclosure avoidance efforts.”); Quercia et al., supra note 5,
at 10 (describing workout programs, and citing an unpublished study finding that the Minneapolis program saves “industry players an average of $16,000 per avoided foreclosure”); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and
Urban Dev., How to Avoid Foreclosure, http://www.hud.gov/foreclosure/index.cfm (last visited Oct.
30, 2006) (including special forbearance, mortgage modification, partial claim, preforeclosure sale,
and deed in lieu of foreclosure, all with conditions). HUD maintains a list of approved counseling
agencies to help homeowners in distress. See Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency,
Remarks Before the Regional Interagency Committee (May 3, 2005) (describing foreclosures as the
most immediate community development challenge and stressing the need for multidimensional mortgage delinquency intervention programs), available at http://www/occ/treas.gov/ftp/release/200594a.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., Find a HUD Approved Housing Counseling Agency,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hccprof14.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
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owner is unsustainable.26 Mortgage loan servicers have technology to assess homeowner sustainability to some extent.27
If it is cheaper for mortgage creditors to do workouts with sustainable borrowers, and if servicers have the technology to identify sustainable borrowers, who are the homeowners with mortgage delinquency
who resort to chapter 13? One possibility is that the defaulting mortgage
borrowers who proceed to chapter 13 to save homes from foreclosure are
the borrowers with the weakest prospects, as they have been turned
down for a workout and are unable to obtain replacement financing.28
Readers unfamiliar with chapter 13 may be surprised by the expense associated with trying to save homes in this system. Although it is
difficult to assess these costs in a vacuum (as opposed to comparing them
with alternative interventions), the chapter 13 price tag may be unduly
high for solving a discrete mortgage problem, perhaps because chapter
13 is priced and structured to deal with collective problems.29 The chapter 13 costs include: a growing court filing fee;30 a trustee’s fee;31 a lawyer’s fee (in the several thousand dollar range);32 a fee for prebankruptcy
26. See Richard A. Phillips & James H. VanderHoff, The Conditional Probability of Foreclosure:
An Empirical Analysis of Conventional Mortgage Loan Defaults, 32 REAL EST. ECON. 571, 573 n.4
(2004) (noting that losses are reduced by foreclosing as quickly as possible in situations where foreclosure is inevitable).
27. See, e.g., Cutts & Green, supra note 25, at 14–15. From an analysis of the conditional probability of foreclosure among home mortgage borrowers in default, Ambrose and Capone concluded
that lenders who are seeking to maximize profits should “offer[ ] loss-mitigation foreclosure-avoidance
options only to true trigger-event defaulters who have a demonstrated hardship and commitment to
the property.” Brent W. Ambrose & Charles A. Capone, Modeling the Conditional Probability of
Foreclosure in the Context of Single-Family Mortgage Default Resolutions, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 391,
407, 428 (1998).
28. Some courts and trustees have opined that chapter 13’s structure may increase the likelihood
of mortgage reinstatement. In re Perez, 339 B.R. 385, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). Yet, this assertion
is far from universally accepted. See Gordon Bermant, Chapter 13: Who Pays the Mortgage?, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., June 2001, at 20 (finding no evidence that plans in which ongoing mortgage payments
are funneled through a trustee are completed at a higher rate).
29. Feibelman, supra note 11, at 162–63 (reviewing public and private administrative costs of
personal bankruptcy and comparing to other systems). Norberg and Velkey found that the costs of
administering chapter 13 were a “sizable portion” of distributions to creditors, ranging from 15% to
18% of trustee disbursements and, in some years, nearly rivaling the distributions to unsecured creditors. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 536 tbl.41.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means, 7
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407, 409 & n.10 (2001) (referring to “hefty administrative expense” of
chapter 13); Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Distributions and Expenses in Chapter 13, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., May 2000, at 22.
32. See, e.g., In re Mullings, No. 06-80164, 2006 WL 2130648 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. July 26, 2006)
($3750 “no-look” fee); see also In re Larson, 376 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) ($175 per hour fee);
In re Murray, 348 B.R. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (explaining chapter 13 fee approval procedures).
See generally Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed Choices—A
Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 194 (1997) (noting that chapter 13 legal services generally cost more than chapter 7 legal services, and that “chapter 13 is not necessarily the best buy of legal services”); Braucher, supra note 13, at 550–52 (“My best estimate is that,
in a majority of chapter 13 cases, lawyers collect at least as much or more as in most chapter 7 cases,
and that the increased time and overhead is not significant for many lawyers, so that on average a
chapter 13 case is more lucrative than a chapter 7 case.”).
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credit counseling and a fee for a postbankruptcy financial management
course;33 higher cost of credit due to a reduced credit score;34 promised
repayment of unsecured debt;35 the mortgage arrearage, interest, and ongoing mortgage payments;36 and, of course, all ongoing expenses. In addition, the local rules of some districts require that ongoing mortgage
payments be funneled through chapter 13 trustees, which can add several
thousand dollars of extra expenses.37 Potential filers’ upfront awareness
of these costs is unknown and itself deserves closer study.38
No one has specifically tracked the outcomes for chapter 13 filers
who file for the purpose of saving their homes from foreclosure, but researchers have collected and analyzed data on chapter 13 outcomes more
generally.39 In a newly-released longitudinal study, Professors Scott
Norberg and Andrew Velkey found, consistent with prior studies, that
two-thirds of the cases in the sample did not result in completed plans.40
In addition, at least half of the debtors in the sample were cycling

33. See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 23, 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h));
id. § 106(c) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(g)).
34. Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statutory Bankruptcy Reform, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 169, 186 (2005).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4), (b) (2000). How much they actually are required to pay to unsecured creditors depends in part on whether they had nonexempt equity because chapter 13 filers must
promise to pay creditors at least as much as they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation. As
noted elsewhere, many debtors in the 2001 CBP reported having mortgages that were fully secured or
undersecured, or had only a bit of equity. See Bahchieva et al., supra note 8, at 94. In addition, the
fact that they promise to commit payment does not mean they pay, especially if they drop out early. In
Norberg and Velkey’s study, fully half of the filers ended up paying nothing to general unsecured
creditors. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 544 tbl.46. Even under BAPCPA, sometimes
higher-income chapter 13 filers will have minimal or no obligations to pay their unsecured creditors.
See, e.g., In re Barr, 341 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006) (finding that BAPCPA disposable income rules trump one’s actual ability to pay unsecured debt).
36. BAPCPA has strengthened the mortgage lender’s entitlement to this treatment. See
BAPCPA, § 306(c)(1), 119 Stat. 23, 80–81 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)) (defining debtor’s principal residence to include mobile homes and to clarify that liens on incidental property do not affect
treatment of lender’s claim).
37. See, e.g., In re Perez, 339 B.R. 385, 410 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (calculating extra amount of
payments for debtors who pay mortgage through trustee over sixty-month plan, but concluding that
none of debtors addressed in plan “deserve to be allowed to make direct payments to their mortgagees” (emphasis added)). See generally Michaela M. White, Direct Payment Plans, 29 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 583, 602–03 (1996).
38. For a study of how homeowners make decisions pending foreclosure, see Barbara Gross,
Consumer Response to Time Pressure: A Qualitative Study of Homeowners in Foreclosure, 21 ADV. IN
CONSUMER RES. 120 (1994). In general, the decision to initiate a bankruptcy is not well understood.
See Tashira K. Hira & Kyle L. Kostelecky, Pilot Study of Consumer Debtors Provides New Insights—
What Influences Debtors’ Attitudes?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 1995, at 1, 1 (“[N]o studies have been
carried out on the decision making process debtors undertake when determining whether to file for
bankruptcy.”).
39. The earlier empirical studies of chapter 13 plan completion have been reviewed elsewhere
and need not be rehashed here. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 7, at 247–50.
40. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 505–06 tbls.18 & 19. Norberg and Velkey studied
795 chapter 13 cases filed in 1994 in seven judicial districts (N.D. Ga., S.D. Ga., M.D.N.C., M.D. Tenn.,
W.D. Tenn., D. Md., W.D. Pa). These districts comprised almost 20% of all the chapter 13 filings that
year. See id. app. A at 549–50. For percentages calculated only from confirmed plans, see id. at 507–
08 tbls.20 & 21.
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through bankruptcy (and often chapter 13) multiple times.41 In Norberg
and Velkey’s words, “with each successive filing, the debtor is less likely
to complete a plan, and more likely to have sought relief without the intent or ability to consummate a plan.”42 It is possible, but unlikely, that
defaulting mortgage borrowers had a higher rate of plan completion than
other filers, or that the noncompleters dropped out of chapter 13 only after having cured their mortgage arrearages.43 Likewise, one would expect defaulting mortgage borrowers to be more likely, not less likely, to
file multiple chapter 13 cases than those who are not faced with the prospect of losing their homes.44
A household-by-household cost-benefit analysis is not the end of
the story, of course. Chapter 13 filers neither shoulder all the costs nor
receive all the benefits of this system. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to characterize the aggregate impact, in part because real estate finance scholars have not conceptualized chapter 13 as a mortgagor protection statute.45 Some researchers clearly are aware that bankruptcy
41. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 497 fig.3. For a breakdown of previous and subsequent filings, see id. at 498 tbl.11.
42. Id. at 519–20.
43. Judges, trustees, and lawyers have opined that debtors might be curing secured debt arrearages before dropping out of their plans, in which case it would be possible that they would save their
homes without plan completion. See Gordon Bermant, What is “Success” in Chapter 13? Why Should
We Care?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2004, at 20, 65. However, “success-by-dismissal stories are
probably rare.” Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461,
474 (1997). Nearly 23% of the chapter 13 cases in the Norberg and Velkey sample were dismissed or
converted (but mostly dismissed) before plan confirmation. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at
506 tbl.18. A single-court study similarly found that most of the chapter 13 filings in the sample that
took place on or right before “foreclosure Tuesday”—and thus were likely home-saving-related—were
dismissed within the first six months. Michael Catrett, A Month of Debtors: “Foreclosure Tuesday”
and the Rush to Chapter 13 in the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., May 2005, at 24, 82–83. In a study of participants in a foreclosure prevention program, debtors were in arrears for, on average, five or six months of mortgage payments. See Quercia et al., supra
note 5, at 20 tbl.7. Six months is likely too short a time for many defaulting mortgage borrowers to
cure their arrearages, which is why some nonchapter-13 interventions are not viable. See DeJarnatt,
supra note 13, at 496; see also Christie, supra note 23, at 886–87 (discussing the difficulty of making up
arrears and continuing with regular mortgage payments).
44. Housing policy scholars have observed recidivism in mortgage troubles outside of bankruptcy. See generally Quercia et al., supra note 5, at 8, 27 (reporting that a study of mortgage counseling participants found that “about 40 percent of all borrowers in the program, and about 30 percent
who avoided foreclosure, reported being late on payments again 12 months after program intervention” and also reporting from literature review that “[e]vidence shows that many borrowers, even if
they can stave off foreclosure once, may face difficulties again several years later”); Christie, supra
note 23, at 886–87.
45. For analyses of state-supplied mortgagor protection statutes, see, for example, Karen Pence,
Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, REV. ECON. & STAT. (2006) (estimating
that loan sizes are smaller in judicial foreclosure states and concluding that this reflects a reduced supply of credit); Terrence M. Clauretie, State Foreclosure Laws, Risk Shifting, and the Private Mortgage
Insurance Industry, 56 J. RISK & INS. 544, 552 (1989) (concluding that judicial foreclosure, statutory
right of redemption and antideficiency statutes add significantly to mortgage risk); Clauretie &
Herzog, supra note 10, at 229, 231 (predicting borrowers in more protective states eventually will pay
higher private mortgage insurance premiums); Charles M. Kahn & Abdullah Yavas, The Economic
Role of Foreclosures, 8 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 35, 46 (1994) (arguing that mortgagor protection
laws have substantial effects on the market); Phillips & VanderHoff, supra note 26, at 584 (proposing
that less protective laws will reduce costs and will lower interest rates). Cf. Michael H. Schill, An Eco-
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plays some role, but tend not to build bankruptcy—and certainly not
chapter 13 in particular—into their analyses.46 Thus, very few real estate
studies even acknowledge the existence of chapter 13 and its antiforeclosure provisions, let alone try to study its impact or compare it to state law
and other approaches.47 Perhaps some real estate finance experts cannot
fathom that defaulting mortgage borrowers would file chapter 13 to save
their homes when they have zero or negative equity,48 but even many of
these experts would acknowledge that the determinants of mortgage default and recovery are not completely understood.49

nomic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 491 (1991) (finding that state mortgage protection laws impact interest rates less than prior studies indicated).
46. See, e.g., Ambrose & Capone, supra note 27, at 407, 422 (discussing a study that included a
bankruptcy variable indicating that debtor filed for some sort of bankruptcy protection). Ambrose
and Capone report:
[B]ankruptcy petitions increase the probability of low-LTV borrower reinstatement by 15 percentage
points (Table 8). This again indicates the presence of trigger-event defaulters who are working to save
their properties. For high-LTV borrowers, the principal effect appears to be in buying time to either
sell the property or forestall foreclosure. The probability of their property sale or foreclosure increases by nearly 4%, while reinstatement rates decline by 2% . . . .
Id. at 422; see also THE REINVESTMENT FUND FOR THE PA. DEP’T OF BANKING, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE FILINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA (2005), available at http://www.trfund.com/resourse/downloads/
policypubs/mortgage.Forclosure.Filings.pdf; Peter J. Elmer & Steven A. Seelig, Insolvency, Trigger
Events, and Consumer Risk Posture in the Theory of Single-Family Mortgage Default, 10 J. HOUSING
RES. 1, 2 (1998).
47. For some studies that do recognize chapter 13, see Quercia et al., supra note 5, at 22 tbl.9
(discussing a study of the Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention program in Minneapolis, which reported
that, between 1991 and 2003, the proportion of participants ending up in chapter 13 has been stable at
around 4%); Cheryl Long, Negative Effects of Personal Bankruptcy for Homeowners: Lost Homes
and Reduced Credit Access, at 20 (July 11, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Colgate University) (using a limited sample of Panel Study of Income Dynamics data, finding that chapter 7 has a
“significant and negative effect on homeownership, but the effect of homeownership of Chapter 13
bankruptcy, although still negative, is no longer significant at the conventional level”).
48. For the literature on conceptualizing default as a put option, see, for example, Brent W.
Ambrose et al., Optimal Put Exercise: An Empirical Examination of Conditions for Mortgage Foreclosure, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 213 (2001) [hereinafter Ambrose et al., Optimal Put Exercise];
Brent W. Ambrose et al., Pricing Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Delay, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 314, 315 (1997) [hereinafter Ambrose et al., Pricing Mortgage Default]; Cutts & Green, supra note 25, at 9–10; Roberto G. Quercia & Michael A. Stegman, Residential Mortgage Default: A Review of the Literature, 3 J. HOUSING RES. 341, 350–51 (1994). Models of default now take transaction
costs into account. See, e.g., Capozza & Thomson, supra note 5, at 115. They also now recognize that
foreclosure is only one possible consequence of default. See Ambrose et al., Pricing Mortgage Default,
supra, at 315; Ambrose & Capone, supra note 25, at 106; Kahn & Yavas, supra note 45, at 35 (noting
that foreclosures occur in a small proportion of instances of nonperformance and using the difference
in rates as a proxy for renegotiation in the analysis); Mickey Lauria et al., An Investigation of the Time
between Mortgage Default and Foreclosure, 19 HOUSING STUD. 581, 582 (2004); Phillips & VanderHoff, supra note 26, at 572 (reporting that 20% of defaults result in actual foreclosure).
49. Real estate finance researchers increasingly recognize that borrowers’ continuation of the
mortgage may depend on factors such as job loss, medical problems, or divorce. See Ambrose & Capone, supra note 27, at 427–28 (1998); Clauretie, supra note 45, at 548 (including variable for trigger
event in spite of mixed evidence for their role); Elmer & Seelig, supra note 46, at 2; cf. Capozza &
Thomson, supra note 5, at 126–27, 130 (study of subprime loans finding that trigger events did not play
expected role); Quercia & Stegman, supra note 48, at 376 (concluding that role of borrower-related
factors and transaction costs in default remained less clear as of 1994). Other research explores the
broader financial climate. See, e.g., Elmer & Seelig, supra note 46, at 14–15 (referring to entire financial picture of each consumer); Easterlow et al., supra note 6, at 376 (referring to interest rates and
macroeconomic climate). But see Quercia & Stegman, supra note 48, at 374–75 (reporting, as of 1994,
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Beyond case-by-case and aggregate financial evaluation, it is important to consider the psychosocial costs associated with government intervention that prolong unsustainable homeownership. Debts that enable
the acquisition of a home can be “a chronic strain on an individual’s financial well-being, and ultimately emotional well-being.”50 A growing
body of literature, largely from the United Kingdom, focuses specifically
on the health impact of mortgage troubles.51 Scholars have reported a
connection between mortgage indebtedness and subjective well-being.52
They also have described “marginal homeownership” or “unsustainable”
homeownership as a public health issue.53 Thus, it is possible that chapter 13, by prolonging unsustainable homeownership while adding extra
financial obligations, serves as a pathway through which home mortgage
indebtedness contributes to adverse health outcomes.54

that “household income and mortgage payment have been found both to have an effect and no effect
on default” and concluding that the mixed results arise from lack of adequate panel data).
50. Patricia Drentea, Age, Debt and Anxiety, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 437, 438, 447 (2000)
(studying credit card debt, but proposing that other types of debt be studied). A number of papers
have been written on the relationship between debt, financial strain, and health. See, e.g., P.R. Duberstein et al., Suicide at 50 Years of Age and Older: Perceived Physical Illness, Family Discord and Financial Strain, 34 PSYCHOL. MED. 137, 142, 144–45 (2004) (reviewing literature showing “significant associations of depression in older adults with severe physical illness, financial strain and relationship
difficulties” and finding mixed results depending on type of regression, but concluding that “[f]inancial
adversity and family discord, particularly in the context of a mental disorder, should alert healthcare
providers to the possibility of suicide risk”); Angela C. Lyons & Tansel Yilmazer, Health and Financial
Strain: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 71 S. ECON. J. 873, 888 (2005) (finding
“[t]here is little evidence that financial strain contributes to poor health suggesting that it is unlikely
that large financial burdens accelerate a decline in health status” but “[i]t may be the case that financial strain may significantly increase the probability of poor health for those with serious health conditions”); Barbara O’Neill et al., Financially Distressed Consumers: Their Financial Practices, Financial
Well-being and Health, 16 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 73, 79–80, 82 (2005) (summarizing a study of
debt management plan participants that found a positive association between health status and recommended financial behaviors—“respondents who reported poorer health are more likely to perceive
their health is affected by financial problems than those in very good health”—as well as finding the
association varies with age, employment status and family size); Richard Reading & Shirley Reynolds,
Debt, Social Disadvantage and Maternal Depression, 53 SOC. SCI. & MED. 441, 442 (2001) (citing studies finding associations between health and financial problems, money worries and housing tenure).
51. See, e.g., JANET FORD ET AL., HOME OWNERSHIP IN A RISK SOCIETY 153–68 (2001); Christie,
supra note 23, at 898–901; Easterlow et al., supra note 6; Sarah Nettleton & Roger Burrows, Mortgage
Debt, Insecure Home Ownership, and Health: An Exploratory Analysis, 20 SOC. OF HEALTH &
ILLNESS 731 (1998); Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 6.
52. See Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 51, at 738–43; see also John Cairney & Michael H.
Boyle, Home Ownership, Mortgages and Psychological Distress, 19 HOUSING STUD. 161, 162–63 (2004)
(discussing Canadian study of differences between homeownership with mortgage debt and homeownership without).
53. See, e.g., Roger Burrows, Mortgage Indebtedness in England: An ‘Epidemiology,’ 13 HOUSING STUD. 5, 6 (1998) (“There is good evidence to suggest that the experience of mortgage arrears is
such a stressful life event and is now so common that it could usefully be reconceptualised as a major
public health issue.”); Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 6, at 478.
54. See Cairney & Boyle, supra note 52, at 172 (referring to the importance of elaborating on the
terms of housing tenure to clarify pathways between homeownership and health).
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The (Sustainable Homeownership) Case for Chapter 13?

Taken together, the assumptions and factors explored in the prior
section invite greater scrutiny of chapter 13 as mortgagor protection. But
the assumptions themselves deserve greater scrutiny. It is an empirical
question whether mortgage servicers offer workout options to all sustainable defaulting mortgage borrowers. There are many reasons why
defaulting borrowers may not be able to get workouts outside of bankruptcy. A mortgage servicer may take a narrow view of sustainability,
both in terms of the surplus income to be eligible and the length of time
over which an arrearage must be paid. Servicers may randomly decline
workouts to sustainable borrowers due to moral hazard concerns.55 Stories have circulated of seemingly arbitrary acts of servicers, negligent servicing, or aggressive pursuit of foreclosure to appropriate debtors’ equity.56 Chapter 13 may provide at least a limited check on servicer
activity that is inconsistent with governmental and societal promotion of
homeownership.57 In addition, even if a defaulting borrower could obtain substitute financing to address the foreclosure, the direct costs of doing so could be considerable and, thus, may decrease sustainability.
Also, for individuals with mortgage delinquency as well as other debt
problems, the costs and risks associated with bankruptcy’s collective forum are somewhat more justified.
For defaulting mortgage borrowers who cannot get a private workout, notwithstanding a reasonable prospect of curing the arrearage, the
existence of chapter 13 may reduce psychosocial costs with respect to sustainable defaulting mortgage borrowers. Some studies have found that
renters tend to have worse health than homeowners with mortgages.58
The litany of oft-mentioned benefits of homeownership need not be repeated here, but homeownership is thought to offer more than physical
shelter; it is positively associated with wellbeing,59 and provides a source
55. Some research suggests that lenders should randomly reject requests for loan workouts to
avoid having to screen for actual borrower distress, but that lenders are more likely to do this if their
policies are not observable. See Wang et al., supra note 25, at 976; see also Ambrose & Capone, supra
note 25, at 117.
56. See Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING
POL’Y DEBATE 753, 756–58 (2004); Duncan Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of Debtor Protection
Rules in Sub-prime Market Default Situations (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working
Paper No. BABC 04-02, 2004) (comparing “high road” and “low road” creditors’ willingness to invest
in antiforeclosure devices, depending in part on whether creditors seek to profit from appropriating
debtors’ equity).
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000) (setting plan lengths).
58. See Cairney & Boyle, supra note 52, at 169–70 (“There is a gradient in mental health status
by housing tenure; home owners without mortgages report lower levels of distress than home owners
with mortgages, who in turn report lower levels of distress than those who live in rental accommodation. This effect holds even after controlling for age, gender, marital status, education, income and
stress.”). But see Belsky et al., supra note 6, at 17–18.
59. See, e.g., Cairney & Boyle, supra note 52, at 162; Dickerson, supra note 5, at 20 (“Research
indicates that homeowners feel better about themselves, maintain better and safer neighborhoods, and
live in neighborhoods that have better schools.”).
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of “ontological security.”60 When individuals struggle with the fear, or
the actuality, of home loss, they may experience a “biographical disruption,” with “profound consequences for a person’s sense of self and social
identity.”61
C.

Identifying Sustainable Homeowners?

Part III.B suggested that chapter 13 might provide an otherwise unavailable workout option for sustainable homeowners. Yet, for the reasons explored in Part III.A, the costs of chapter 13 may outweigh the
benefits as applied to unsustainable homeowners. A judge is supposed to
confirm a chapter 13 repayment plan only after finding that “the debtor
will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the
plan.”62 This can be interpreted as a tool to sort filers with housing problems on the basis of sustainability.
Notwithstanding this feasibility mandate, commentators believe this
provision has little bite in practice, even in the face of evidence that filers
are often unsuccessful.63 Prior to BAPCPA, judges spent little time on
60. Burrows, supra note 53, at 6 (noting circumstances challenging ontological security of homeownership); Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 6, at 474–77 (noting that uncertainty and train of events
out of control “are coming to be regarded as amongst the most crucial determinants of poor health in
contemporary societies”). From a study of families in Swinton in the United Kingdom, Christie observed:
The common experience of mortgage arrears, beyond inadequate income and financial hardship, was
enforced spatial mobility and exclusion from a range of social networks and services. But beyond
these physical and material problems the household members also spoke about the emotional trauma
of being in arrears: the worry that they would not manage, the fear of loosing [sic] their home, the uncertainty about the future, and the sense of failure. As Nettleton, et al., argue, problems arose not just
with the practicalities of what happened but with how it made them feel. Although the pressures of
managing on limited resources had repercussions for families and households, the burden often fell
heavily on individuals, and especially on women. While impoverishment eroded the autonomy of
households, and closed down their options, the management and experience of arrears contributed to
the creation and perpetuation of gender inequalities within the home.
Christie, supra note 23, at 898 (citation omitted); id. at 901 (“[S]ocial exclusion was a feature of the
lives of defaulting households.”); see also William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The Effects of
Homeownership on the Self-Esteem, Perceived Control and Life Satisfaction of Low-Income People, 60
J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 173, 174–76 (1994).
61. Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 51, at 746; Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 6, at 474–75
(referring to social isolation, stigma, changed social status, sense of failure and impact on selfconfidence associated with having lost their homes constituting biographical disruption). The conception of biographical disruption comes from Michael Bury, Chronic Illness as Biographical Disruption,
4 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 167, 169 (1982) (“[I]llness, and especially chronic illness, is precisely that
kind of experience where the structures of everyday life and the forms of knowledge which underpin
them are disrupted.”). Bury disaggregates biographical disruption into three components: (1) “disruption of taken-for-granted assumptions and behaviors,” (2) “more profound disruptions in explanatory
systems normally used by people, such that a fundamental re-thinking of the person’s biography and
self-concept is involved,” and (3) a response “involving the mobilization of resources, in facing an altered situation.” Id. at 169–70.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2000).
63. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or
Treadmill, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1088–89 (2004); LoPucki, supra note 43, at 474–75; Norberg
& Velkey, supra note 7, at 508–09 (referring to the “heartbeat test” of feasibility). Even members of
the U.S. Supreme Court have hinted at the possibility that the feasibility analysis was inadequately
undertaken. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 496–97 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Some
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front-end screening of personal bankruptcy filers.64 Indeed, some judges
apparently do not review chapter 13 plans at all. They have delegated
this review, in one form or another, to chapter 13 trustees, who do not
have financial incentives to heavily scrutinize homeownership sustainability.65 Furthermore, whether due to financial incentives or beliefs in
“last, last chances,” it also seems that debtors’ lawyers are insufficiently
screening their potential clients for ability to complete a multiyear repayment plan.
Leaving the chapter 13 door wide open does offer some catch-all
consumer protection.66 At least in the very short term, chapter 13 tempers the impact of the decision to turn unsecured consumer debt into
mortgage debt and then defaulting on it.67 Chapter 13 buys time for people who have misunderstood the terms of their adjustable rate mortgages

judges and trustees also have made plans less feasible for debtors by requiring that they promise to
pay certain percentages of unsecured debt, which makes curing the mortgage even more difficult.
Braucher, supra note 32, at 196. It is possible, however, that BAPCPA will bring an end to these practices.
64. See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 598 (2001) (noting that “[j]udges simply don’t spend much time on consumer cases” and explaining why); LoPucki, supra note 43, at 472 (“most [bankruptcy judges and
chapter 13 trustees] are wedded to the idea that cases must be mass processed and cannot be given
individual attention”). Researchers at the Federal Judicial Center found in the 1980s that judges spent
an average of six minutes per chapter 7 nonbusiness case and twenty-three minutes per chapter 13
case. See Gordon Bermant et al., A Day in the Life: The Federal Judicial Center’s 1988–1989 Bankruptcy Court Time Study, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 491, 504 tbl.3 (1989). If the same survey were conducted
today, one would suspect both that the average would be smaller and, even then, would be skewed
upward by a very small number of cases that took considerable time. See Gordon Bermant, A Day in
Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2003, at 20 (reporting that 4440 chapter 7 cases and 1823 chapter 13 cases are filed on the average working day).
65. See generally Braucher, supra note 32, at 195–96.
66. For an earlier iteration of this argument, see generally William C. Whitford, The Ideal of
Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 400 (1994) (“The boom in consumer bankruptcy
could be seen as an indictment of other supposed consumer remedies—if consumers had other methods of stopping collection activities they find intolerable, fewer would use bankruptcy.”); id. at 402 (“If
the debtor claims a defense to a secured claim under the contract or consumer protection legislation,
however, bankruptcy provides an efficient forum for asserting that claim. The litigation takes place in
bankruptcy court, where delays in obtaining a hearing because of case backlog are less common than
in general civil courts. Because the consumer debtor has an attorney for the bankruptcy, obtaining
legal help in asserting the defense is practical. Often the bankruptcy attorney will assert a defense to a
secured claim without charging an additional fee to the basic charge for the bankruptcy.”).
67. See HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 4, at 1, 6, (reporting cashout of $139 billion in home equity in 2004); Bucks et al., supra note 4, at A29 (noting that 31% in the
2004 SCF used funds for debt consolidation); Glenn Canner et al., Mortgage Refinancing in 2001 and
Early 2002, FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 2002, at 469; Kathleen W. Johnson, Recent Developments in the
Credit Card Market and the Financial Obligations Ratio, FED. RES. BULL., Autumn 2005, at 473, 482
(hypothesizing that households are substituting mortgage debt for credit card debt); George S. Masnick et al., Emerging Cohort Trends in Housing Debt and Home Equity 26 figs.12 & 13 (Harvard Univ.
Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. W05-1, 2005) (showing “skyrocketing” in cash-out
refinances and “sharp increase” in second mortgage borrowing); Richard T. Curtin, National Survey of
Home Equity Loans, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, WP51 14 (Oct. 1998) (between
1988 and 1997, finding that “[t]he largest change has been the growing use of second mortgages for the
consolidation of existing credit card debt”).
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on the verge of a major reset.68 Chapter 13 also can be seen as a type of
short-term housing policy for senior citizens who now are more likely to
carry mortgages and thus run the risk of home loss.69 Homeowners who
believe they are victims of predatory lending might resort to chapter 13
while explicit regulation of predatory lending remains mired in controversy.70 But, as of now, chapter 13 has neither a proven track record with
respect to these functions nor the specific tools that might be required to
deal with these issues adequately.
This discussion leads me to conclude, at least tentatively, that even
if chapter 13 should remain a component of an overall antiforeclosure
scheme, some additional sustainability-based sorting would be desirable.
This brings us to BAPCPA’s revisions of the Bankruptcy Code.71

68. For discussion of the growth of ARMs, see Bucks et al., supra note 4, at A29–A30 (noting
that in 2004 SCF, 15% had ARMs, up from 11.4% in 2001); James R. Hagerty, The Home-Mortgage
Muddle: Some Borrowers Are Confused by Terms of Adjustable-Rate Loans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11–12,
2006, at B4 (reporting Mortgage Bankers Association statistics that ARMs accounted for about a third
of mortgages originated in 2004 and 2005); HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra
note 4, at 16 (indicating that the share of conventional mortgage originations attributed to ARMs was
18% in 2003 and 35% in 2004). For an analysis of default risk based on lack of knowledge of terms or
affordability once the rate is reset, see Erick Bergquist et al., Pipeline, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2000, at 12
(2005) (reporting that New York ratings agency, Fitch, Inc., anticipated a 10–15% rise in subprime
delinquencies due to resets and inability to refinance in light of inadequate home value); Brian Bucks
& Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms? 18–20 (Federal
Reserve Working Paper No. 2006-3, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/
2006/200603pop.pdf; Christopher L. Cagan, Mortgage Payment Reset: The Rumor and the Reality 30–
32 (First American Real Estate Solutions, Feb. 8, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.loanperformance.com/infocenter/whilepaper/FARES_resets_whitepaper_021406.pdf. See
generally Donald F. Cunningham & Charles A. Capone Jr., The Relative Termination Experience of
Adjustable to Fixed-Rate Mortgages, 45 J. FIN. 1687, 1702 (1990) (concluding that adjustable rate mortgages have a greater default risk and a lower prepayment probability than fixed rate mortgages).
69. See William C. Apgar & Zhu Xiao Di, Housing Wealth and Retirement Savings: Enhancing
Financial Security for Older Americans, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT
INCOME (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., forthcoming 2006) (reporting on growth in mortgage debt among
older Americans that is outpacing growth among younger Americans); Craig Copeland, Debt of the
Elderly and Near Elderly, 1992–2001, 4 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2, Apr. 2004, at 1, 3, available
at http://ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/0404notes.pdf (reporting on the growth in relative magnitude of housing
payments since 1992, the increase in households with debt payments exceeding 40% of income and
attributing trends in part to home mortgage refinancing and home equity loans that transform unsecured debt into secured debt); Masnick et al., supra note 67, at 2–3, 25 (evaluating mortgage debt
trends of households reaching retirement age, and exploring elderly households’ use of home equity
through cash-out refinances and additional loans).
70. For studies of predatory lending, see, e.g., Apgar & Di, supra note 69 (reporting on equity
stripping and mortgage abuse among older Americans); Apgar & Fishbein, supra note 4, at 1 (noting
“noticeable uptick in abusive lending practices” involving low-income and minority households); id. at
12 (“In addition to available survey data, there is a growing body of econometric evidence that mortgage brokers do in fact target uninformed borrowers, and that their focus on the subprime marketplace is reinforced by a mortgage delivery system that provides incentives to participants to take advantage of the situation.”); Belsky et al., supra note 6, at 11.
71. For an overview of the legislation’s consumer bankruptcy aspects, see generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 11–34
(2001). For a longer history of consumer bankruptcy development, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 32–37 (1995).
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IV. BAPCPA AND SUSTAINABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP SORTING
A.

Credit Counseling

BAPCPA requires a briefing from an approved credit counseling
service within 180 days prior to filing as a condition for bankruptcy eligibility.72 A requirement relating to prebankruptcy counseling has the potential to channel financially distressed homeowners into a targeted antiforeclosure program. In that instance, a counselor with special expertise,
and not judges who must handle myriad situations in a court setting,
would be able to assess a defaulting mortgage borrower’s likelihood of
curing the mortgage and help achieve a private workout or suggest a viable exit strategy.73 As of now, it is likely that many of the approved
counseling programs focus on unsecured debt management and will not
be well-equipped to address mortgage problems.74 Yet, this need not be
the case.
Also, judges are required to scrutinize the circumstances of individuals who file for bankruptcy without the requisite counseling briefing,
which itself presents a narrow opportunity for sorting defaulting homeowners. A debtor who has not received such a briefing must submit a
waiver request to the court if she wishes to be eligible for bankruptcy.75
Debtors with many kinds of financial problems, but no foreclosure looming, should be able to satisfy the credit counseling requirement before filing, assuming that they know the counseling provision exists.76 Those
who have a foreclosure scheduled imminently seem more likely to seek a
court waiver of this requirement.77
72. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 23, 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1)).
73. This is the function of mortgage foreclosure prevention programs. See U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., supra note 25.
74. See Lea Krivinskas, “Don’t File!”: Rehabilitating Unauthorized Practice of Law-Based Policies in the Credit Counseling Industry, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 51, 70 (2005); David A. Lander, A Snapshot
of Two Systems that are Trying to Help People in Financial Trouble, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 161,
186–87 (1999). For an assessment of the counseling requirement and its likely effectiveness overall,
see Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Pre-Petition
Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
549, 554 (2005).
75. See BAPCPA § 106(a), 119 Stat. at 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)). The statute
also specifies circumstances under which the requirement will not apply at all, but they are limited, and
I do not review them in this article.
76. Although not the topic of this article, this assumption of knowledge of the provision should
not go unchallenged. In addition to pro se filers, some debtors apparently have underprepared lawyers who have not ensured that their clients have satisfied BAPCPA’s requirements. See, e.g., In re
Collins, 335 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (represented debtor dismissing and refiling fifth
case at time of law change without preparing to rebut presumption applicable in repeat filings); In re
Skarbek, No. 05-9002b, 2005 WL 3348879, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2005) (lawyer conflating
credit counseling requirement with financial management course requirement); In re Collins, 334 B.R.
655, 656 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (represented debtor voluntarily dismissed chapter 13 and filed chapter 7 next day, became entangled in new repeat filing provisions, and failed to serve creditors with notice of request for automatic stay extension).
77. For post-BAPCPA credit counseling cases involving looming home loss, see, for example, In
re Dixon, 338 B.R. 383 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); In
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The statute explicitly delegates to judges the power to decide,
within some limits, whether the waiver is warranted.78 The limits operate
as a one-way ratchet; when the statute is clear, this usually means the
judge is required to eject the defaulting mortgage borrower from bankruptcy.79 When more judicial discretion is required, it generally will relate to whether the debtor’s certification has described “exigent circumstances that merit a waiver” that is “satisfactory to the court.”80 An
important dimension of the “exigent circumstances” inquiry should be
whether bankruptcy will serve some otherwise unavailable insurance
function for the debtor if initiated today.81 A debtor should not have exigent circumstances that merit a waiver simply because a foreclosure is
scheduled.82
I must be realistic about the scope and impact of this alleged sorting
opportunity. First, some (although not all) judges already seem disinclined to interpret “exigent circumstances” in the way I have described.83
Indeed, some judges believe the provision is foolish and have expressed
frustration when its application requires ejecting a defaulting mortgage
borrower from bankruptcy.84 Although this provision is clearer than others in BAPCPA, the language still leaves room for consequential statu-

re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In
re Mingueta, 338 B.R. 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006);
In re Miller, 336 B.R. 232 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005);
In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).
78. BAPCPA § 106(a), 119 Stat. at 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(B)).
79. In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. at 888–89
(“[T]here is literally no other possible outcome, when the very specific, nondiscretionary terms of the
Act are applied just as they read. . . . [T]he structuring of this requirement was a matter of policy,
committed in the first instance to Congress and not one that the courts may second-guess on its merits.”).
80. See BAPCPA § 106(a), 119 Stat. at 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)(i)) (emphasis
added).
81. See, e.g., In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. at 882–83 (refusing to approve counseling waiver because
chapter 7 contains no tools to fix on longer term basis the debtor’s problem, and thus filing was not
exigent); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (2000).
82. See In re Dixon, 338 B.R. at 388 (upholding the bankruptcy court’s finding, on an abuse of
discretion standard, that debtor did not show exigent circumstances sufficient to merit a waiver when
state law provided twenty days notice of foreclosure sale); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 700 (holding that
imminent foreclosure, while constituting an exigent circumstance, does not merit a waiver). This provision should be seen as analogous to a court considering whether to lift the automatic stay because
property is not necessary for an effective reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B). There, the
court evaluates not only whether the property is theoretically necessary, but whether that reorganization is reasonably possible. See United Sav. Ass’n of Texas vs. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484
U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988).
83. For example, in the District of Maryland and elsewhere, a claim of exigent circumstances
requires only the assertion that the debtor is facing a looming event, such as foreclosure, and not an
assessment of how the debtor got into the situation or how the bankruptcy case will help. See In re
Childs, 335 B.R. 623 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (per curiam); In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2005) (holding that sheriff’s sale is an exigent circumstance whether or not exigency is self-created or
created by other factors).
84. See, e.g., In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005); Judges Openly Criticize New
Law; Opinions Interpreting BAPCPA Amendments Offer Harsh Reviews, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS,
Mar. 16, 2006.
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tory interpretation. For example, the debtor requesting a waiver must
submit a “certification.”85 Many judges interpret “certification” to require formalities and explicit detail,86 while others are more flexible regarding both substance and form.87 Courts can disagree on whether the
statute creates a waiting period between requesting counseling services
and filing a bankruptcy petition.88 Judges also affect the sorting impact
of this provision by establishing the consequences of ineligibility, with
most courts dismissing the case but some courts “striking” the case.89
The ways in which judges handle such issues alter the capacity of the
provision to serve as a screen for sustainable homeownership. Additionally, appellate courts will likely review a bankruptcy court’s handling of a
waiver under a highly deferential standard and, thus, may not provide a
meaningful check on less stringent applications of the meaning of “exigent circumstances that merit a waiver.”90
Furthermore, the screening opportunities offered by this provision
are incomplete. Many filers who do not comply with the counseling re-

85. See BAPCPA § 106(a), 119 Stat. at 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)).
86. See, e.g., In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 155 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (requiring certification to
contain names of agencies contacted, manner in which debtor contacted agencies, and responses of
agencies); In re Mingueta, 338 B.R. 833, 837 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and stating that “[a]n unsubstantiated request is not a certification”); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693 (agreeing
with collected cases measuring sufficiency of certification against 28 U.S.C. § 1746). In Mingueta,
however, the debtor made no explanation, let alone an unsubstantiated one. In re Mingueta, 338 B.R.
at 837.
87. See In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (per curiam) (certification requires
simple description and need not be under oath); see also In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 296 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 2005) (certification need not be under penalty of perjury).
88. For example, does the debtor have to request counseling from more than one service? Compare In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 649 (“To allow the Debtor under these circumstances to fulfill his obligation by contacting but a single credit counselor would reward token effort.”), with In re Hubbard,
333 B.R. 377, 387 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (a debtor need not scour the field for available credit counselors, but rather need only contact one). Does a lawyer’s inquiry suffice? In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. at
385 (debtor may not rely on counsel’s general conclusion that services are unavailable, but may allow
lawyer to make request specifically on her behalf). Can a debtor file earlier than five days after first
requesting counseling if she can show counseling would have been unavailable for the next five days in
any event? Compare In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 700 (“[W]hile the Court finds merit to the argument
that the requirement probably should be five prepetition days, the Court cannot conclude that the
plain reading of the statute supports that result.”), and In re Graham, 336 B.R. at 298 n.6 (“[I]f a
debtor reasonably believes that he or she cannot reasonably complete the offered credit counseling
within the five-day period, he or she need not wait until the end of the five-day period to file his or her
bankruptcy petition.”), with In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (seeming to interpret the five-day waiting period strictly).
89. If the petition is “stricken” for ineligibility rather than “dismissed,” a debtor still will lose a
filing fee and automatic stay protection, but will not be a “repeat filer” upon returning to bankruptcy a
second time within a year. For cases in which the petition is stricken, see, for example, In re Salazar,
339 B.R. 622 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (upholding validity of postbankruptcy foreclosure sale in
stricken case where debtor was ineligible because of the lack of credit counseling); In re Rios, 336 B.R.
117, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 388 (deciding to strike filing due to
BAPCPA-provided consequences of having prior case dismissed); cf., e.g., In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at
161 (deciding that dismissal was necessary); In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134, 141 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006)
(concluding dismissal, rather than striking, is proper response).
90. See, e.g., In re Dixon, 383 B.R. 383, 383 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing grant of waiver
under clear error standard due to discretionary nature of waiver request).
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quirement will not be identified (if they do not file a waiver request) and
will slip into the system unnoticed.91 In busy districts, this is especially
likely to occur. Also, the counseling requirement is becoming so easy to
satisfy through short internet briefings that even defaulting mortgage
borrowers may be able to satisfy the requirement before filing.92 Thus,
the number of cases screened this way will likely be extremely small.
B.

Repeat Filers

BAPCPA also introduced a provision requiring higher scrutiny of
repeat filers.93 This represents a stronger statutory charge to sort filers
based on sustainable homeownership than the counseling provision.
Prior to BAPCPA, a bankruptcy filer virtually always was protected by
an automatic stay (with no affirmative showings) that enjoined all collection activity, including foreclosure.94 Creditors could seek to lift the
automatic stay, but this entailed considerable cost.95 At least on the
books, the new law shifts the burden sharply to the debtor if she fits the
statutory definition of a repeat filer (e.g., if she has had a prior case dismissed in the past year). The statute provides that the automatic stay
will be terminated after thirty days if the debtor does not make affirmative showings, noted below, to the judge’s satisfaction.96
This provision clearly implicates defaulting mortgage borrowers,
and intentionally so.97 Defaulting mortgage borrowers facing imminent
91. See generally In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at 154–60 (agreeing with the Ross court); In re Ross, 338
B.R. at 140 (“Especially in a jurisdiction such as this one with a high volume of individual filings, it is
quite conceivable that administration of an individual’s case might proceed despite § 109(h) ineligibility because the question does not immediately come to the attention of the court.”); id. at 141 (noting
that some commentators believe the § 109(h) requirement is waivable). Section 109 eligibility requirements are generally thought not to be jurisdictional. Thus, they do not prevent the receipt of
relief if no one raises the issue. Cf. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 109.06 (15th ed., rev. 2006) (discussing chapter 13 eligibility requirements).
92. For a list of approved counselors, including many internet-based providers, see U.S. Trustee
Program, List of Credit Counseling Agencies Approved Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 111,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc_approved.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
93. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 302, 119 Stat. 23, 75–76 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
95. Id.
96. See id. § 362(c)(3) (providing that stay terminates after 30 days for some filers). Another
provision, § 362(c)(4), addresses debtors who have had two cases pending and dismissed within the
prior year. In such instances, the stay is not to go into effect at all unless a party in interest makes the
requisite showing within thirty days. To simplify the discussion, I focus only on § 362(c)(3).
97. The home mortgage industry was a key supporter of this provision. See, e.g., Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1998; Responsible Borrower Protection Act; and Consumer Lenders and Borrowers
Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and H.R. 3146 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, 105th Cong. 148, 153–56 (1998) (testimony of Thomas H.
Boone, Countrywide Home Loan, Inc.) (proposing additional provisions that would require an automatic stay to be lifted in thirty days for repeat filer); Nat’l Bankr. Rev. Comm’n, Commission Meeting
(Dec. 17, 1996) (statement of Garry Seligson, Vice President and General Counsel, Citicorp Consumer
Asset Division) (proposing restrictions on repeat filing that require debtor to show significant change
in circumstances demonstrating that she will be able to confirm and perform a plan); Memorandum
from Eric Friedman, Countrywide Home Loans, to Melissa Jacoby and Elizabeth Warren, Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School (April 14, 1997) (on file with author) (offering repeat filing statistics, re-
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foreclosure cannot wait to get beyond BAPCPA’s one year lookback period, as other debtors might.98 Consequently, this provision increases the
possibility that defaulting mortgage borrowers will have only short-term
automatic stay protection unless they can justify extended protection.99
Although not representative of the universe of cases, many of the publicly available court decisions on repeat filing thus far involve chapter 13
filers with mortgage delinquency.100
The repeat filer’s “good faith” is a pivotal component of the
debtor’s request for an extension of the automatic stay beyond thirty
days.101 The statute delineates some factual circumstances to be considered, including whether the debtor has experienced a substantial change
in the debtor’s “financial or personal affairs” since the dismissal of the
prior case and whether there is “any other reason to conclude” that the
debtor will complete the instant case successfully.102 To fill gaps in the
statute regarding the meaning of good faith, courts have been resorting
to multifactor and fact-driven tests of good faith in the common law that
involve likelihood of fixing financial problems, including curing a mortgage.103
Screening chapter 13 repeat filers could be consistent with the goal
of promoting sustainable homeownership without prolonging unsustainable homeownership. It could help ensure that those who are allowed
multiple chances to use chapter 13’s mortgagor protection features have
a reasonable likelihood of success, and also might encourage mortgage
servicers to allow a wider array of workout options with sustainable borrowers. Due to the posture of the required review, it would be difficult
for judges to allocate this responsibility to chapter 13 trustees. Ideally,
porting that repeat filers comprised 10% of the bankruptcy filers they were servicing, and advocating
for elimination of stay in repeat filings).
98. See, e.g., Catrett, supra note 43, at 82 (“During 1999 and 2001, 50% of the sampled chapter
13 filings occurred on the Monday before and the morning of Foreclosure Tuesday, and in 2003, 40%
of the filings occurred on those two days. The automatic stay stops the auction on the courthouse
steps.”).
99. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-08, § 311, 119 Stat. 23, 84–85 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(C)).
100. For repeat filing cases involving looming home loss, see, for example, In re Easthope, No. 0620366, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 826 (Bankr. D. Utah Mar. 28, 2006); In re Ziolkowski, 338 B.R. 543 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 2006); In re Baldassaro, 338 B.R. 178 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006); In re Kurtzahn, 337 B.R. 356
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2006); In re Parker, 336 B.R. 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Ball, 336 B.R. 268
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re Warneck, 336 B.R. 181 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Johnson, 335 B.R.
805 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Collins, 335 B.R. 646 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
101. BAPCPA § 302, 119 Stat. at 75 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)) (providing that party in interest may move for stay continuation and must demonstrate that the filing “is in good faith as to the
creditors to be stayed”).
102. Id. See generally Richardo I. Kilpatrick, Selected Creditor Issues Under the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 817, 823 (2005) (noting
that the provision may require “mini-confirmation hearings”).
103. See, e.g., In re Baldassaro, 338 B.R. at 187–88 (adjusting the First Circuit good faith test); In
re Ball, 336 B.R. at 274; In re Mark, 336 B.R. 260, 265–67 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006); In re Havner, 336 B.R.
98, 103–04 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re Galanis, 334 B.R. 685, 692–93 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005); In re
Montoya, 333 B.R. 449, 458–60 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005).
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however, it should lead debtors’ lawyers to engage in more due diligence
of their potential debtor clients’ likelihood of financial recovery, both in
a first filing and in a repeat filing.
Notwithstanding the potential of this new repeat filing provision to
sort individuals on the basis of homeownership sustainability, statutory
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code tend to have a more modest impact
than their appearance on paper would suggest.104 Preferring the role of
arbiter of disputes to system gatekeeper, some judges may be reluctant to
deny a defaulting mortgage borrower’s request for a stay extension
unless creditors actively oppose it.105
In addition, as suggested in the discussion of the credit counseling
provision, BAPCPA’s provisions are remarkably susceptible to a wide
array of statutory interpretations.106 The repeat filing provision is drafted
particularly poorly, leading to some recent judicial interpretations that
may significantly mute the screening function I envision. For example,
under one interpretation, terminating the stay frees only those creditors
who have taken formal action against the debtor (lawsuits, garnishment,

104. See generally Jacoby, supra note 34, at 176–82.
105. See In re Beasley, 339 B.R. 472 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006); In re Phillips, 336 B.R. 818, 870
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006) (“Attorneys who practice before this Court are advised that if their Motion
to Extend the Automatic Stay is unopposed, the Court may grant the Motion under certain circumstances without the necessity of a hearing.”); In re Warneck, 336 B.R. 181, 182 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“Where no presumption of bad faith arises, and where no party objects, a request to extend the
automatic stay should be liberally granted.”); In re Charles, 332 B.R. 538 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). In
an earlier writing, I predicted that the efficacy of this provision would depend on creditor vigilance
because some judges believed that debtors may need multiple opportunities to succeed in chapter 13
repayment plans. See Jacoby, supra note 34, at 179–80.
106. There are multiple theories to explain the drafting choices. Complex and uncertain new
gatekeepers, plus the additional uncertainty of judicial discretion, may have furthered the drafters’
goal of imposing costs to arbitrarily thin the ranks of bankruptcy filers. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 7,
at 262–66 (identifying discharge reduction function of bankruptcy reform legislation). It is not clear,
of course, that deterring bankruptcy filings will automatically increase lenders’ profits. See, e.g., Sumit
Agarwal et al., Exemption Laws and Consumer Delinquency and Bankruptcy Behavior: An Empirical
Analysis of Credit Card Data, 43 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 273 (2003). The BAPCPA screens may have
been attractive to proponents because of the ways in which they might favorably alter their leverage in
nonbankruptcy negotiations. However, one cannot rule out the “legislative monster” theory, namely
that the bankruptcy system has grown into something sufficiently complex that Congress cannot understand it well enough to predict the effects of amendments. See L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO
Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1050, 1051 (1990) (noting that Congress intended RICO for use against crime syndicates but it has been applied to “legitimate businesses”);
Garrett E. Land, Judicial Assessment or Judicial Notice? An Evaluation of the Admissibility Standards
for DNA Evidence and Proposed Solutions to Repress the Current Efforts to Expand Forensic DNA
Capabilities, 9 J. MED. & L. 95, 114 (2005) (“DNA legislation has produced a monster . . . . ”). Congress’ reliance on interest groups has the potential to ameliorate or exacerbate the legislative monster
problem. Professors Nourse and Schacter’s study of the Senate Judiciary Committee suggests that
Congressional actors were more inclined to delegate authority to lobbyists regarding BAPCPA than
on other legislative items. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587–88 (2002). Institutions engaged in consumer lending activities likely delegated the drafting and lobbying tasks to government affairs lawyers
rather than employees who understood the inner workings of bankruptcy. Government affairs lawyers
are less well-suited to fine tune the system in more substantive and sophisticated ways.
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liens) prior to the bankruptcy filing.107 Under another, terminating the
stay does not free creditors seeking to pursue property of the estate, such
as a home subject to a defaulted mortgage loan, from the stay.108 The latter interpretation, if adopted more broadly, will substantially hinder the
ability of mortgage servicers to pursue foreclosure even when a filer cannot show that her current circumstances are likely to enable her to cure
her arrearage and continue with her payments.
Finally, the provision applies to only a subset of repeat filers who
have a relatively short gap between their cases.109 This will not capture
all repeaters who avoid foreclosure through multiple bankruptcy filings.110 Thus, as with the credit counseling waiver review, this new provision is significantly underinclusive with respect to screening for homeownership sustainability.
V. CONCLUSION
Instruments of housing policy appear in unexpected places.111 Although scholars of mortgage debt and foreclosure generally are aware
that some bankruptcy filers own homes, chapter 13’s specific antiforeclosure function has not received sufficient scholarly attention.
Thus, this article aims to encourage more critical analysis of the role of
chapter 13 as part of a larger mortgagor protection scheme at a time
when both bankruptcy law and the home mortgage market are in flux.
Although firmer conclusions will depend on the result of further
study of chapter 13 as mortgagor protection law, this article has sought to
examine the assumption that prolonging homeownership in all instances
is consistent with promoting sustainable homeownership. Thus, reform
efforts that encourage the sorting of defaulting homeowners or encourage cheaper, more targeted, nonbankruptcy workouts ultimately may be
beneficial to the overall scheme. These considerations provide an alter107. See In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 277, 278
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). As an interesting twist, this interpretation serves as an incentive for creditors
to engage in formal, rather than informal, collection activity across the board, which is a subject of
recent media interest.
108. See In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Johnson, 335 B.R. 805, 806
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006). Although the House Committee Report says little other than restating the
statutory language, it gives the impression of a complete termination of the automatic stay. See H.
REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 69 (2005).
109. See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 301, 119 Stat. 23, 75 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)).
110. See In re Blinco, No. 3:06-BK-01569-GLP, 2006 WL 2471961 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Aug. 28,
2006) (repeat filer not falling within new restriction); In re Gould, No. 06-12324-WCH, 2006 WL
2403562 (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2006) (husband and wife alternate filings not falling within new
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native framework in which to evaluate the 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code.

